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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,1  Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun wrote, “[t]he 
States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or 
potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies.” 2  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court took a different position in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 3   In a plurality 
opinion, the Casey Court set forth a new standard for evaluating the 
constitutionality of statutes that regulate abortion, known as the “undue 
burden” standard. 4   One of the Court’s primary motivations for 
promulgating this new standard was to allow states, in their regulatory 
capacity, to express their preference for childbirth over abortion.5  The 
undue burden standard, however, lacks any objectively ascertainable 
elements, making it very easy to manipulate and very difficult for the 
circuit courts to apply consistently.6 
The process of informed consent as we know it is eroding under the 
undue burden standard.  The standard’s failure to adequately distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible regulations, coupled with the 
high level of deference to legislatures, enables states to debase informed 
consent statutes by improperly requiring disclosure of one-sided moral 
and political information, as opposed to the objective medical 
information of which these statutes are rightly and typically comprised.7  
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1476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 2 Id. at 759. 
 3 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 4 Id. at 877. 
 5 Id. at 883, 916. 
 6 Id. at 986; see also infra Part IV (discussing various circuit courts’ application of 
the undue burden standard). 
 7 Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws 
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 66–67 (2012) (“There 
is no doubt that the abortion-specific biased counseling statutes discussed fail the AMA’s 
ethical standards, especially since the AMA ‘opposes legislative measures that would 
impose procedure-specific requirements for informed consent or a waiting period for any 
legal medical procedure.’ The requirement that physicians present facts accurately 
disqualifies deceptive and misleading statements. Making statements that the patient does 
	
2013]How the Undue Burden Standard is Eroding Informed Consent 233 
 
As a result, what was once a private, personal, and professional dialogue 
between physicians and their patients concerning medically objective and 
relevant information is warping into a monologue of legislatively 
coerced recitations of anti-abortion propaganda.8  Therefore, contrary to 
Justice Blackmun’s proclamation, under the undue burden standard states 
are free to intimidate women into continuing their pregnancies under the 
guise of protecting maternal health and potential life.9  The question 
before the circuit courts is whether states may do so by disguising their 
moral propaganda as medically accurate and relevant information, and by 
coercing physicians to deliver this ideology as a part of the process of 
informed consent to the abortion procedure.10 
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) defines informed 
consent as “a process of communication between a patient and physician 
that results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a 
specific medical intervention.” 11   On the AMA website, under the 
heading “Patient Physician Relationship Topics,” the AMA lists a 
number of guidelines that physicians should follow in soliciting a 
patient’s informed consent.12  The AMA suggests that physicians discuss 
the diagnosis, nature, purpose, risks and benefits of the suggested 
                                                                                                                                  
not want to hear is unethical according to the AMA, and the patient’s expressed desire 
not to be given certain information should be respected. Finally, there is nothing that 
provides support for forcing patients to be exposed to the results of an ultrasound against 
their wishes.”). 
 8 Id. at 70 (“Abortion opponents have attempted to co-opt the doctrine of informed 
consent to further their political goal of reducing the number of abortions . . . This vision 
should be rejected, as should the cynical use of the banner of informed consent to 
disguise an anti-abortion agenda . . . biased counseling laws . . . cannot be part of ethical 
informed consent practices because they are designed to make women’s choices 
regarding ending their pregnancies less well-informed and less voluntary, all in the hope 
of discouraging abortions.”) (emphasis added). 
 9 See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling 
Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y 
REV. 4 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gpr100406.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2013); Joerg Dreweke & Rebecca Wind, State Mandated Abortion Counseling 
Materials Often Medically Inaccurate, Biased, GUTTMACHER INST., (Oct. 26, 2006), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2006/10/26/index.html.  See also infra Part IV. 
 10 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 
889 (8th Cir. 2012); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 467 F.3d 716 (8th 
Cir. 2006); see also Stuart v. Huff, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2011 WL 6740400 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 
22, 2011), aff’d, No. 12-1052, 2013 WL 265083 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2013). 
 11 AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-
topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.page (last visited Jan. 21, 
2013) (emphasis added). 
 12 Id. 
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treatment; the risks and benefits of alternative treatments; and the risks 
and benefits of refraining from treatment altogether.13  Nowhere does the 
AMA suggest that physicians should offer patients their personal moral 
or political opinions about a given treatment, let alone states’ moral and 
political viewpoints.14  In fact, apart from stating that obtaining informed 
consent is both a legal and ethical obligation, the AMA guidelines do not 
suggest that states play any role in shaping the informed consent 
dialogue.15 
While AMA guidelines govern the process of informed consent for 
most medical procedures, the process of informed consent to an abortion 
has strayed drastically from that paradigm.16  This shift is attributable to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey17 and Gonzalez v. Carhart.18  Some states have 
argued that the holdings of these cases give them license to commandeer 
the physician-patient relationship in the context of abortion to ensure that 
“so grave a choice is well informed.”19  Apparently these states do not 
consider the AMA’s standard process of informed consent, which is both 
legally and ethically adequate to inform patients of all relevant 
information all other medial procedures, to be sufficient to ensure 
informed consent to the abortion procedure.20  Or perhaps these states 
question women’s ability to make informed decisions.21   Whatever their 
                                                                                                                                  
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, 
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 12, 2013).  See generally Gold & Nash, supra note 9. 
 17 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 18 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 19 Id. at 158; see also cases cited supra note 10. 
 20 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (“Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or 
continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is 
prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even 
in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to 
encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight 
that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that 
there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a 
certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”). 
 21 Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224–25 (2009) (“Carhart’s portrayal of 
women evokes a century-old societal view of femininity. The Carhart Court’s cabined 
view of women’s decision-making capacity reflects a gender-stereotyped view of 
women’s nature. The Court also exposed its discriminatory view of women as decision-
makers by articulating a new paradigm of “informed consent” in the abortion context that 
controverts well-established rules of patients’ right to informed consent in healthcare law. 
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motive, these states have reformed their informed consent statutes in the 
context of abortion to exploit the laxity and latitude Casey and Carhart 
provide.22 
These recently revised informed consent statutes have been subject 
to constitutional challenges on both First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.23  Many mandated specific disclosures have been challenged as 
violating physicians’ First Amendment free speech rights by 
unconstitutionally compelling their speech.24  These statutes have also 
been challenged as unconstitutionally violating women’s Fourteenth 
Amendment privacy rights by imposing an undue burden upon their right 
to have an abortion.25  Statutes regulating abortion are not evaluated 
under traditional First or Fourteenth Amendment principles, however.26  
Rather, statutes that regulate abortion are analyzed under the undue 
burden standard promulgated in Casey. 27   When evaluating similar 
statutes, some courts have held that they are constitutional under the 
undue burden standard, some have held that they are not, and still others 
have upheld or invalidated these statutes on First Amendment grounds.28  
Though the Casey Court did hold that states have the right to express 
their preference for childbirth and to persuade women not to have an 
abortion, the Court did not intend to allow states to convey their 
preference for childbirth by integrating mandatory disclosures of 
inaccurate, misleading, and irrelevant information into the informed 
                                                                                                                                  
This article focuses on Carhart’s disturbing reasoning—that competent adult women lack 
the capacity to determine for themselves what is best for their own health—and evaluates 
its implications in the abortion context and in other areas of medical treatment related to 
pregnancy.”); Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 13 (“These examples show the Court’s 
willingness to accept the notion that women’s decision-making abilities are deficient, 
which is supposed to justify forcing women to receive certain information, to endure 
mandatory waiting periods, and to have some options taken away from them 
altogether.”). 
 22 State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 
16; see also cases cited supra note 10. 
 23 See cases cited supra note 10. 
 24 See cases cited supra note 10. 
 25 See cases cited supra note 10. 
 26 See cases cited supra note 10.  See generally Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 27 See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 28 See cases cited supra note 10. 
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consent process.29  Yet, some courts have permitted this practice under 
the undue burden standard.30 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on the history 
and fundamental principles of informed consent.  Part III reviews the 
Supreme Court cases that have shaped abortion jurisprudence and 
promulgated the standards for evaluating the constitutionality of 
informed consent statutes.  Part IV discusses four federal circuit court 
opinions that have explicitly acknowledged the existence of confusion 
and inconsistency in courts’ application of the undue burden standard,31 
and then provides examples of confused, conflated and inconsistent 
application of the undue burden standard through an analysis of two 
recent circuit court cases.32 
Lastly, Part V provides an in depth discussion of the proposed 
solution, namely, that the undue burden standard should be restructured 
into a three-prong test that courts can apply more objectively and 
consistently, thereby effectuating the intent of the Casey Court while 
preserving the integrity of the informed consent process.33  Organizing 
the elements of the undue burden standard into a structured, three-prong, 
disjunctive test would require courts to engage in a complete analysis 
and prevent them from manipulating the undue burden standard by 
emphasizing just one of the elements.34  Under this proposed test, the 
burden would be on the plaintiff challenging the statute to demonstrate 
that: (1) the mandated disclosure or disclosures are (a) not truthful, (b) 
misleading, or (c) irrelevant to the abortion procedure; (2) the statute is 
                                                                                                                                  
 29 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 878–82 (1992) (“[I]f the information the State requires to 
be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be 
permissible.”) (emphasis added). 
 30 See generally Vandewalker, supra note 7; Gold & Nash, supra note 9. 
 31 Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 
1999) on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side 
Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 32 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th 
Cir. 2012); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th 
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 530 F.3d 724, 
753 (8th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716, 722 
(8th Cir. 2006). 
 33 Casey, 505 U.S. at 930 (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, and far 
less manipulable, than the undue burden standard adopted by the joint opinion.”) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 985–86 (“[I]ts efforts 
at clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently manipulable and will prove 
hopelessly unworkable in practice.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34 See infra discussion Part V. 
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not calculated to inform women’s decision, and therefore has an 
improper purpose; or (3) the statute has the effect of creating a 
substantial obstacle for women seeking an abortion.35  If a plaintiff were 
able to demonstrate any of the above, the statute would fail the undue 
burden analysis and would be struck down as an unconstitutional undue 
burden on women’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to an abortion.  
Courts would engage in an exhaustive analysis of each prong before 
determining that a challenged statute is constitutional. 
The proposed solution would also require each subpart of the first 
prong of the analysis, namely, whether the information is truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant to the abortion procedure, to be evaluated 
independently. 36     Finally, this solution would decrease judicial 
deference to legislatures in evaluating the first and second prongs of the 
analysis.37  Adopting a structured reformulation of the standard would 
permit states to further their interests in protecting potential life and 
expressing their preference for childbirth, more effectively protect 
women’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy right to an abortion, and enable 
the circuit courts to evaluate abortion regulations impartially and 
consistently.  This Comment concludes by briefly discussing the public 
policy consequences of failing to reform the problematic undue burden 
standard, as well as the public policy benefits of adopting the proposed 
solution. 
II.  INFORMED CONSENT TO MEDICAL PROCEDURES 
The central guiding principles of informed consent are patient 
autonomy and self-determination.38  There are five elements to informed 
consent: (1) disclosure; (2) understanding; (3) voluntariness; (4) 
                                                                                                                                  
 35 See infra discussion Part V.  Each of the elements of the suggested three-prong 
analysis is present in the Casey joint opinion.  The solution lays both in organizing the 
elements in a way that is more rigid and easier to apply, and in making the additional 
proposed adjustments in applying the rigid version of the standard.  See generally Casey, 
505 U.S. 833. 
 36 See infra discussion Part V. 
 37 See infra discussion Part V; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (“The proper focus of 
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for 
whom the law is irrelevant.  Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert 
testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether in a large fraction of the cases 
in which the restriction is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to undergo an abortion.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Hana Osman, History and Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4 
INT’L ELEC. J. OF HEALTH EDUC. 41, 44–45 (2001), available at http://js.sagamorepub
.com/gjhep/article/view/4073 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
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competence; and (5) consent.39  This Comment focuses on disclosure and 
voluntariness, and how the undue burden standard has been used to 
uphold anti-abortion regulations that undermine these fundamental 
elements of informed consent.40 
Disclosure is the most pertinent element of informed consent for 
purposes of this Comment, as the majority of constitutional challenges to 
recent informed consent statutes focus on provisions involving 
mandatory informational disclosures. 41   There are three different 
standards for the informed consent disclosure requirement.42  The first is 
the professional practice standard, which emphasizes the patients’ best 
medical interests, as determined by the physician. 43   The reasonable 
person standard, on the other hand, places the most emphasis on patient 
autonomy and self-determination, and attempts to determine what the 
patient’s best medical interests are as perceived by the patient, not the 
physician.44  Finally, the subjective standard suggests that maximization 
of autonomy requires the quantity and quality of information to be 
tailored to each of the individual patients based on their needs. 45  While 
the subjective standard is arguably preferable, each standard has its 
respective strengths and weaknesses.46 
Voluntariness is also critical to obtaining informed consent. 47  
Voluntary agreement to a given treatment is central to patient autonomy 
and self determination because patients are only able to make educated 
and rational decisions if they are not being manipulated, pressured, or 
coerced to elect an option to which they are resistant. 48   Though 
physicians will inevitably influence their patients’ decisions to some 
degree, the process of informed consent fails if physicians coerce their 
patients to select a given course of treatment. 49   Manipulation is 
considered a form of coercion in the context of informed consent because 
it diminishes patients’ capacity to arrive at intelligent and informed 
                                                                                                                                  
 39 Id. 
 40 See infra discussion Part IV. 
 41 See cases cited supra notes 10, 31, and 32. 
 42 Osman, supra note 38, at 44. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Osman, supra note 38, at 41, 45 (citing EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO AND DAVID C. 
THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MED. PRACTICE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 
1993)). 
 49 Id. 
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decisions.50  Therefore, decisions that result from the use of manipulative 
tactics are not considered to be the result of patients’ own free choice and 
do not meet the voluntariness requirement of informed consent.51 
Before Casey, informed consent statutes typically required that 
physicians discuss certain topics with their patients, but physicians 
retained the discretion to decide the specific information to disclose 
about that topic.52  In line with the subjective and professional practice 
approaches of disclosure, physicians were free to convey information 
regarding each topic that, in their professional, medical opinion, was 
most accurate, credible, and germane to their patients’ specific 
circumstances.53  Recently revised informed consent statutes, however, 
force physicians to disclose specific information that states consider 
accurate, significant, and relevant, without regard to physicians’ 
professional judgment.54  These revised statutes do not fall within the 
parameters of any recognized standards of disclosure. 
Today, most states’ informed consent statutes have more stringent 
requirements for the abortion procedure than are required for any other 
medical procedure.55  The provisions of informed consent statutes that 
apply to abortion are not only harsh and inflexible; some go as far as 
requiring that misleading statements be made to patients. 56   These 
                                                                                                                                  
 50 See Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 38–40. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Manian, supra note 21; see also infra note 83. 
 55 See State Policies In Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra 
note 16; see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 10, 31, and 32; see also Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (“Despite the fact that apparently no other 
Missouri statute . . . requires a patient’s prior written consent to a surgical procedure, the 
imposition . . . of such a requirement for termination of pregnancy even during the first 
stage, in our view, is not in itself an unconstitutional requirement . . . . we see no 
constitutional defect in requiring [written consent] only for some types of surgery as, for 
example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a 
specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.”).  Contra State Facts About 
Abortion: New Jersey, State Center, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org
/pubs/sfaa/new_jersey.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (“Abortion is one of the safest 
surgical procedures for women in the United States.”). 
 56 See Amanda McMurray Roe, Not-So-Informed Consent: Using the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship to Promote State-Supported Outcomes, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 205, 206–
07 (2009) (“The relatively recent development of informed consent statutes for specific 
procedures, however, seems to have upended the traditional notion of informed consent. 
Instead of promoting autonomous choice, these statutes mandate that doctors provide 
particular disclosures about certain procedures. In addition, rather than providing patients 
with objective information, some of these statutes appear to provide patients with slanted 
information that pushes them toward a predetermined ‘right’ choice.”); see also Chinué 
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statutes mandate the delivery of certain materials and information that 
states claim is essential to the process of obtaining women’s informed 
consent to an abortion. 57   These so-called informed consent statutes 
undermine the goals of informed consent by disseminating false or 
incomplete information. 58   Many of the disclosures the states have 
mandated in these revised statutes consist of information that is disputed 
within the medical community or taken out of context, 59  as well as 
information that pertains solely to the embryo or fetus, and not the risks 
and benefits of the procedure itself.60  These statutes, more accurately 
described as anti-abortion statutes, undermine the principle of patient 
autonomy and demote patient wellbeing, the primary tenets and goals of 
informed consent.61  Nevertheless, state legislatures are passing these 
anti-abortion statutes under the guise of informed consent, and some 
courts are upholding them under the protection of the amorphous undue 
burden standard.62 
III.  EVOLUTION OF INFORMED CONSENT STATUTES FOR ABORTION 
PROCEDURES THROUGH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The Road To Casey 
States’ ability to regulate abortion has varied over the past forty 
years.  In Roe v. Wade63 the Supreme Court held that women’s ability to 
choose whether to terminate their pregnancies is a fundamental right.64  
                                                                                                                                  
Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Inaccuracy of 
State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4, 6 (2006), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html (last visited Nov. 
15, 2013) (“In some cases, the state goes so far as to include information that is patently 
inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence to the charge that states’ abortion counseling 
mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women about the abortion procedure 
than to discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.”). 
 57 Richardson & Nash, supra note 56, at 6. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See generally Richardson & Nash, supra note 56.  See also State Policies In Brief: 
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 16. 
 61 Vandewalker, supra note 7, at 45–49. 
 62 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 
889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 63 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 64 Id. at 169–70 (“As recently as last Term, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, we recognized the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
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Adhering to the traditional Fourteenth Amendment practice of applying 
strict scrutiny when states abridge fundamental rights, the Court balanced 
the competing interests; women’s right to terminate their pregnancies 
against states’ interest in protecting women’s life and health and the 
potential life of the fetus.65  The result was the “trimester framework,” 
which allowed varying levels of regulation based upon the increasing 
strength of the states’ interest as the pregnancy progressed.66  In the first 
trimester, the states were not permitted to interfere with women’s right to 
terminate their pregnancies in any way whatsoever.67  During the second 
trimester, only those regulations intended to preserve the life or health of 
women were permitted.68  States had broadest authority to regulate the 
abortion procedure in the third trimester.69   States were permitted to 
enact statutes that regulated third trimester abortions if the statutes were 
designed to preserve the life or health of women or the potential life of 
the fetus.70 
Despite the trimester framework’s alleged prohibition of states’ 
interference during the first trimester of women’s pregnancies, the Court 
in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth 71  upheld a Missouri 
informed consent statute for pre-viability abortion under Roe. 72   The 
Court’s decision to uphold a statute requiring women to sign an informed 
consent form before obtaining a first-trimester abortion was the Supreme 
Court’s first decision upholding a regulation during the first trimester 
through informed consent under Roe’s trimester framework.73  Perhaps 
unaware of the floodgates it was opening, the Court held that requiring 
written informed consent to abortion was constitutional, despite being the 
only medical procedure for which written informed consent was required 
in Missouri at the time.74  This was the first case in which the Court 
                                                                                                                                  
or beget a child. That right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 162–66. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
 71 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 72 Id. at 67. 
 73 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 55. 
 74 428 U.S. at 67. 
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suggested that, due to the nature of the abortion decision, the state has an 
interest in ensuring the decision is fully informed.75 
A few years later, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 76  the Court again acknowledged states’ 
interest in ensuring that women’s decisions are informed, as described in 
Danforth, but nevertheless struck down an informed consent provision 
on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional violation of women’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion.77   The Court held that the 
informed consent provision was invalid because it did not give 
physicians adequate discretion to determine what information to disclose 
to patients, considering patients’ specific, individual circumstances. 78  
The Court also concluded that the statute impermissibly attempted to 
persuade women to continue their pregnancies.79  The majority in Akron 
struck down the informed consent provision on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, but added that such informed consent statutes may violate the 
First Amendment as well.80 
                                                                                                                                  
 75 Id. (“The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it 
is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and 
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the 
decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of 
requiring her prior written consent.”).  This was also one of the first cases dealing with an 
informed consent statute; previous cases typically dealt with statutes expressly and 
directly prohibiting or limiting access to the procedure.  See generally, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
 76 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 77 Id. at 443. 
 78 Id. at 443–44 (“It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure 
that appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular 
circumstances. Danforth’s recognition of the State’s interest in ensuring that this 
information be given will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the 
woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.”). 
 79 Id. at 444 (holding that the statute “attempts to extend the State’s interest in 
ensuring ‘informed consent’ beyond permissible limits” because “the information 
required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to 
withhold it altogether”). 
 80 Id. at 472 (“This is not to say that the informed consent provisions may not violate 
the First Amendment rights of the physician if the State requires him or her to 
communicate its ideology.  However, it does not appear that Akron Center raised any 
First Amendment argument in the Court below.”) (citations omitted).  This serves as an 
interesting point of reference because while the Court here was only beginning to 
consider the First Amendment implications of informed consent statutes, recent informed 
consent statutes are repeatedly challenged on both First Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds today.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds 
(Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds 
(Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006).  Cf. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion 
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The Court found another informed consent statute to be invalid in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,81 
under similar reasoning. 82   Citing Akron, the Court again ruled on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, striking the informed consent provision 
down due to the specific and, in the Court’s opinion, irrelevant 
disclosures that the statute required. 83     The dissenting opinion in 
Thornburgh also expressly addressed the potential First Amendment 
                                                                                                                                  
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing undue burden under the 
Fourteenth Amendment although plaintiff only challenged on First Amendment grounds).  
While questions regarding the interaction of the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis of informed consent statutes sprouted from the majority’s dicta, the dissenting 
opinion seems to have planted the seed for the undue burden standard.  Akron, 462 U.S. 
at 453 (“In my view, this ‘unduly burdensome’ standard should be applied to the 
challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular 
‘stage’ of pregnancy involved. If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burden’ the 
fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination 
that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.”) (citations omitted).  
The dissent proposed the undue burden standard as a possible analytical framework for 
abortion cases, but also suggested that deference to legislative determinations regarding 
whether a given regulation is “unduly burdensome” is not appropriate.  Id. 
 81 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
 82 Id. at 764 (“The requirement . . . that the woman be informed by the physician of 
‘detrimental physical and psychological effects’ and of all ‘particular medical risks’ 
compound the problem of medical attendance, increase the patient’s anxiety, and intrude 
upon the physician’s exercise of proper professional judgment. This type of compelled 
information is the antithesis of informed consent. That the Commonwealth does not, and 
surely would not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery 
or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real 
purpose. Pennsylvania, like Akron, ‘has gone far beyond merely describing the general 
subject matter relevant to informed consent.’ In addition, the Commonwealth would 
require the physician to recite its litany ‘regardless of whether in his judgment the 
information is relevant to [the patient’s] personal decision.’ These statutory defects 
cannot be saved by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 83 Id. at 763 (“The requirements of [the statute] that the woman be advised that 
medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father is responsible for 
financial assistance in the support of the child similarly are poorly disguised elements of 
discouragement for the abortion decision. Much of this would be nonmedical information 
beyond the physician’s area of expertise and, for many patients, would be irrelevant and 
inappropriate. For a patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the “information” in its 
very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship. 
As any experienced social worker or other counselor knows, theoretical financial 
responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. And a victim of rape should not 
have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for support if she 
continues the pregnancy to term. Under the guise of informed consent, the Act requires 
the dissemination of information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it 
advances no legitimate state interest.”). 
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implications of these informed consent statutes, 84  but contrary to the 
dissent in Akron, suggested that regulations should be evaluated using 
rational basis review under which the states are afforded a heavy dose of 
deference.85 
In the cases following Roe v. Wade, members of the Court 
suggested various standards for evaluating the constitutionality of 
statutes that regulate abortion, but it was Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services86 that bespoke the demise of Roe’s trimester framework.87  The 
Court explicitly articulated the intent to abandon the trimester 
framework, and also suggested that states’ interest in potential life begins 
at conception.88  Interestingly, however, even in a case that so clearly set 
the stage for Casey, the Court took notice of the lower court’s conclusion 
that a provision of the statute, which was akin to the speech-and-display 
ultrasound requirements of many recent informed consent statutes, was a 
content-based regulation that violated physicians’ First Amendment right 
to free speech.89 
B.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey90 began,”[l]iberty finds no refuge in 
a jurisprudence of doubt.”91  Ironically, however, the Casey plurality 
                                                                                                                                  
 84 Id. at 830 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Addressing the First Amendment issue, 
Justice O’Connor wrote, “I do not dismiss the possibility that requiring the physician or 
counselor to read aloud the State’s printed materials if the woman wishes access to them 
but cannot read raises First Amendment concerns. Even the requirement that women who 
can read be informed of the availability of those materials, and furnished with them on 
request, may create some possibility that the physician or counselor is being required to 
‘communicate [the State’s] ideology.’”). 
 85 Id. at 789–90. 
 86 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 87 See id. at 518. 
 88 Id. (“This Court has emphasized that Roe implies no limitation on a State’s 
authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and the preamble 
can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment . . . There is also no reason why 
the State’s compelling interest in protecting potential human life should not extend 
throughout pregnancy rather than coming into existence only at the point of viability. 
Thus, the Roe trimester framework should be abandoned.”) (citations omitted). 
 89 Id. at 512 (“In a separate opinion, Judge Arnold argued that Missouri’s prohibition 
violated the First Amendment because it ‘sharply discriminate[s] between kinds of 
speech on the basis of their viewpoint: a physician, for example, could discourage 
an abortion, or counsel against it, while in a public facility, but he or she could not 
encourage or counsel in favor of it.’”). 
 90 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 91 Id. at 844. 
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opinion introduced a standard that has created tremendous doubt and 
ambiguity in an already confused and controversial abortion 
jurisprudence.92  In one fell swoop, the Supreme Court: (1) manipulated 
the essential holdings of Roe v. Wade by including the word “undue,” 
which allowed for exponentially more regulation of abortion; 93  (2) 
disposed of the trimester framework and the application of strict scrutiny 
to statutes that regulate abortion; 94  and (3) overturned Akron 95  and 
Thornburgh, 96  which had held that abortion informed consent laws 
cannot intentionally influence a woman’s choice.97 
                                                                                                                                  
 92 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
585 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Today we abide Casey, whose force much of the argument here 
fails to acknowledge. It bears reminding that Roe survived Casey only in a recast 
form . . . We must and do apply today’s rules as best we can without hubris and with less 
sureness than we would prefer . . . .”). 
 93 Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(“Whatever the ‘central holding’ of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes 
dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to 
precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way 
a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”). 
 94 Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“It seems particularly 
ungrateful to carve the trimester framework out of the core of Roe, since its very rigidity 
(in sharp contrast to the utter indeterminability of the ‘undue burden’ test) is probably the 
only reason the Court is able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe ‘has in no sense 
proven unworkable,’”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 96 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 97 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 442–49; see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760 (“[W]e have 
consistently rejected state efforts to prejudice a woman’s choice, either by limiting the 
information available to her, or by ‘requir[ing] the delivery of information designed ‘to 
influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’”) (citations 
omitted).  The Court also supplanted the Salerno standard for facial challenges with the 
undue burden standard in the abortion context.  See generally United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  See also Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 
526, 529 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he facial challenge standard should include a factual 
inquiry in abortion regulation cases. Justice O’Connor wrote: ‘In striking down the 
Pennsylvania law, we did not require [plaintiffs] to show that the provision would be 
invalid in all circumstances.’ Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Souter, emphasized that 
a law constitutes an ‘undue burden,’ and is therefore invalid, if ‘in a large fraction of the 
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to undergo an abortion.’”) (citations omitted); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 483 
(7th Cir. 1999) (“In Casey, the Court appears to have tempered, if not rejected, Salerno’s 
stringent “no set of circumstances” standard in the abortion context, without expressly 
saying so.”). 
246 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:231 
 
1.  The Undue Burden Standard 
The undue burden standard was set forth in the plurality opinion of 
Casey.98  In the most complete articulation of the standard, the Court 
explained: 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion 
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid 
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in 
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the 
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s 
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its 
legitimate ends.99 
This explanation, however, is circular, as it fails to adequately 
define the key terms that, together, compose this standard.100  Instead of 
offering any clear definitions or objective criteria, the plurality attempted 
to clarify the standard by providing hypothetical examples of what it 
might have considered an undue burden, and what it would not.101  These 
examples, many of which will be discussed briefly here, were offered in 
a disjointed, piecemeal discussion of the standard in what amounted to a 
disjointed and confusing seventy-page decision.102 
The undue burden standard is comprised of multiple parts.  First, as 
stated above, a regulation poses an undue burden if it “has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.”103   Thus, the substantial obstacle prong is 
itself a disjunctive test with two parts: purpose and effect.104  A statute is 
unconstitutional if its intended purpose is to present a substantial obstacle 
by make it more difficult for women to obtain abortions. Even if the state 
did not intend to create a substantial obstacle for women seeking 
abortions, a statute can be deemed unconstitutional if it nevertheless has 
the effect of presenting such an obstacle.105 
                                                                                                                                  
 98 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 99 Id. (emphasis added). 
 100 See Roe, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 101 Id.  See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 876–902. 
 102 Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 876-902. 
 103 Id. at 877. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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a. When Does An Obstacle Become A “Substantial Obstacle?” 
Statutes regulating abortion are constitutional unless they have the 
purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle for women seeking 
abortions.106  Thus, it is important to know precisely when an obstacle 
becomes unconstitutionally “substantial.”   The Court in Casey did not 
define “substantial obstacle” in objective terms, however, or draw any 
absolute line differentiating a permissible obstacle from an 
unconstitutionally substantial obstacle.107  Rather, the Court stressed that 
states may persuade women to choose childbirth but may not impose an 
undue burden on their right to choose.108  But it is almost impossible to 
determine whether statutes are successfully persuading women to choose 
childbirth or unconstitutionally hindering women from obtaining 
abortions.  Statutes designed to persuade women to choose childbirth 
over abortion would measure their success in achieving that goal by the 
level of decrease in the rate of abortions.  The Court has said, however, 
that a decrease in “a large fraction” of women having an abortion is 
evidence that the regulation was calculated to hinder, not inform the 
woman’s choice.109  The fact that one result, a decrease in the rate of 
abortions, can be used to measure the success of a permissible regulation 
or to demonstrate an impermissible purpose is highly problematic. 
The Court briefly explained that simply making an abortion more 
costly or more difficult is not, in itself, a substantial obstacle.110  On the 
other hand, the Court held that statutes that prevent a “large fraction” of 
women from exercising their right to an abortion do create an undue 
                                                                                                                                  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“In evaluating 
abortion regulations under that standard, judges will have to decide whether they place a 
‘substantial obstacle’ in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. In that this standard is 
based even more on a judge’s subjective determinations than was the trimester 
framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent ‘judges from roaming at large in the 
constitutional field’ guided only by their personal views.  Because the undue burden 
standard is plucked from nowhere, the question of what is a ‘substantial obstacle’ to 
abortion will undoubtedly engender a variety of conflicting views.”) (citations omitted). 
 108 Casey, 505 U.S. at 965. 
 109 Id. at 925. 
 110 Id. at 874 (“Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of 
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or 
any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not 
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or 
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where 
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision 
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
248 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:231 
 
burden.111   The Court instructed lower courts to engage in a factual 
analysis involving testimony and studies to determine the extent to which 
a regulation interferes with women’s right to an abortion, but gave no 
explanation as to how those facts should be weighed, or what facts would 
transform a permissible obstacle into an unconstitutional one. 112  
Unfortunately, lower courts are left guessing at where the Court intended 
the line to be drawn.113 
b. Is the Statute’s Purpose to Present a Substantial Obstacle? 
The legitimacy of states’ purpose is ascertained by evaluating 
whether statutes have been calculated to inform or, instead, calculated to 
hinder women’s decisions.114  Statutes have an improper purpose and 
present an unconstitutional undue burden if the chosen measures are 
calculated to hinder women’s free choice.115  When determining whether 
statutes are calculated to hinder women’s free choice or not, the analysis 
must be centered on those who are actually affected by the restriction.116  
If a statute imposes a more stringent requirement upon minors seeking an 
abortion, for example, the focus of the inquiry is how that particular class 
of minors is affected; it would not matter if the class of minors 
comprised only a small proportion of the total group of women seeking 
abortions. 117   Again, the Supreme Court explained that lower courts 
should engage in an analysis led by facts, studies, testimony, and 
common sense to determine if, of the women affected by the statute, it 
would act as a substantial obstacle in a “large fraction” 118  of those 
cases.119 
                                                                                                                                  
 111 Id. at 925. 
 112 Id. at 991 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“But what is 
remarkable about the joint opinion’s fact-intensive analysis is that it does not result in any 
measurable clarification of the “undue burden” standard. Rather, the approach of the joint 
opinion is, for the most part, simply to highlight certain facts in the record that apparently 
strike the three Justices as particularly significant in establishing (or refuting) the 
existence of an undue burden; after describing these facts, the opinion then simply 
announces that the provision either does or does not impose a “substantial obstacle” or an 
“undue burden.”). 
 113 See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 480 (7th Cir. 1999) (“When is a burden 
‘undue’ as opposed to merely incidental?”). 
 114 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 894 (“The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the 
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”). 
 117 Id. 
 118 At least one court has struggled to determine when a group becomes a “large 
fraction” such that the effect of the statute would warrant invalidating the statute.  See A 
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The Court gave two examples of statutes that would hinder 
women’s free choice, and therefore have an impermissible purpose.120  
First, the Court explained, unnecessary health regulations that have the 
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to women seeking 
an abortion impose an undue burden and are unconstitutional. 121  
Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate as to what is considered an 
“unnecessary” health regulation, nor did it give an explanation of when 
or how an unnecessary health regulation could be calculated to inform a 
woman’s choice.122  The Court stopped short of saying outright that if a 
health regulation is unnecessary, it is calculated to hinder a woman’s 
choice, although that is arguably the only reasonable inference.123 
Statutes that strip women of the ability to make the decision to have 
an abortion before their pregnancies proceed beyond the point of 
viability would also fit the Court’s paradigm of statutes that are 
calculated to hinder women’s choice.124  This implies that states may 
prohibit women from making the ultimate decision to terminate their 
pregnancies after viability, which was true even under Roe’s trimester 
framework. 125   This also implies, however, that states may prohibit 
women from making the earliest possible decision to terminate her 
                                                                                                                                  
Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 119 Casey, 505 U.S. at 925 (“Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert 
testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether ‘in a large fraction of the cases 
in which [the restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to undergo an abortion.’ ‘A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means 
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman’s free choice, not hinder it.’”) (citations omitted). 
 120 Id. at 878. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id.  This contradicts the Court’s earlier comment, however, that states are free 
to enact measures that are intended to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion, even if the measures do not further a health interest.  Id. at 886.  In other words, 
the Court implied that unnecessary health regulations are acceptable, so long as they do 
not have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of the woman seeking an 
abortion.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 886. 
 124 Id. at 879. 
 125 Id. at 879; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (“For the stage 
subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human 
life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”) 
(citations omitted).  Sadly, the protections of the trimester framework have been 
abandoned, but the ability to hinder women from choosing an abortion is the little 
binding precedent that has remained of the holding in Roe. 
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pregnancy, as long as the ultimate decision is theirs.126   The Court’s 
failure to address this inference makes it impossible to distinguish 
between statutes that unconstitutionally “hinder” women from obtaining 
abortions and those that constitutionally delay them, since “to hinder,” by 
definition, is “to cause delay, interruption or difficulty in.”127 
The Court also offered examples of statutes that would be 
calculated to inform women’s free choice, which would therefore have a 
proper purpose and would not present an unconstitutional undue 
burden.128  First, the Court would find statutes that require disclosure of 
information that is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision 
to have an abortion to be calculated to inform women’s choice. 129  
Unfortunately, the Court did not supply any real guidelines to instruct 
lower courts how to determine whether the given information is truthful, 
non-misleading, and relevant.130  While the question of truth may seem 
easy to discern, it can become quite difficult in the face of disputed 
medical and scientific evidence.131  The Court did not discuss how the 
undue burden standard would apply in the event of inconclusive or 
                                                                                                                                  
 126 Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–88. 
 127 Hinder Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hin
der?s=t (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).  Nevertheless, this rationale led the Court to uphold 
the twenty-four hour mandatory waiting period at issue in the case.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 
879. The Court opined that requiring a woman to wait at least twenty-four hours between 
receiving certain information and having an abortion is not a substantial obstacle.  Id. The 
Plaintiffs presented the Court with evidence that the mandated twenty-four hour waiting 
period often resulted in a delay of a week or more before a woman could obtain the 
procedure.  Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While a general requirement that a 
physician notify her patients about the risks of a proposed medical procedure is 
appropriate, a rigid requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in practice) 
much longer to evaluate the significance of information that is either common knowledge 
or irrelevant is an irrational and, therefore, ‘undue’ burden.”). Despite having emphasized 
the importance of implementing a highly factual analysis involving testimony and studies 
in earlier parts of the opinion, the Court failed to engage in a highly factual analysis on 
the real effects of the waiting period.  Id. Instead, the Court insensitively, or perhaps 
unknowingly, made light of this waiting period without giving any recognition or 
acknowledgement to the prolonged difficulties and discomforts of pregnancy that the 
women were made to endure during the mandatory waiting period.  Id. 
 128 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 129 Id. at 882–83 (“If the information the State requires to be made available to the 
woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.  We also see 
no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion 
of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those 
consequences have no direct relation to her health . . . informed choice need not be 
defined in such narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made 
irrelevant.”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See generally Osman, supra note 38. 
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disputed medical authority, or where states exaggerate the credibility of 
ill-supported studies and information.132  Determining when information 
is misleading is a question separate and apart from the issue of 
truthfulness, because even truthful information can be misleading when 
taken out of context. 133   The Court again neglected to address this 
problem, however.  The Court’s failure to acknowledge and provide 
guidance with regard to these concerns has led some lower courts to 
automatically conclude that if information is truthful, it is therefore non-
misleading, which is certainly not always true.134 
c. Does the Statute Have the Effect of Creating A Substantial 
Obstacle? 
While the Court spent considerable time discussing the “purpose” 
prong of the undue burden standard, it provided even less guidance with 
regard to the “effect” prong.135  To clarify the “effect” prong, the Court 
merely explained that a regulation is unconstitutional if it is a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose in a “large 
fraction” of the cases in the group for whom the law is a restriction.136  
Unfortunately, the “effect” prong suffers from the same lack of clarity 
and definitions as the “purpose” prong.  This is concerning, since, 
without further guidance, there is almost unfettered discretion bestowed 
upon courts in deciding whether the effect of a given regulation is 
“substantial” or not.137 
2. The Dissenting Opinions in Casey 
The Justices who dissented in Casey recognized that the standard, 
as promulgated, was ambiguous and would be impossible for the lower 
courts to apply consistently.138  The first indication that this standard is 
flawed lies in the fact that it was a plurality opinion, with four 
independently written dissenting opinions in which six Justices 
                                                                                                                                  
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.; see also Vandewalker, supra note 7. 
 134 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 
(5th Cir. 2012).  See generally Osman, supra, note 38; Vandewalker, supra note 7. 
 135 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–79, 885–97. 
 136 Id. at 965.; see supra text accompanying note 118. 
 137 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 138 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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partook.139   The Justices’ qualms with this amorphous standard were 
made very clear in their dissents. 
The most vehement dissent was authored by Justice Scalia, who 
maintained that the joint opinion failed to sufficiently clarify the undue 
burden standard, and that its failed attempt only demonstrated further 
that the standard is unworkable and easy to manipulate.140  Justice Scalia 
then engaged in a discussion about the problems that lower courts 
attempting to apply this standard would likely encounter in the future.141  
The Justice acknowledged the incredible difficulty in determining when 
a burden becomes a “substantial burden,” and argued that this ambiguity 
invites judges to draw subjective conclusions and use personal opinions 
to shape their analysis.142   Justice Scalia suggested that the differing 
conclusions of the plurality and dissenters regarding whether or not the 
provisions at issue were “substantial obstacles” exemplified this point.143 
C.  Relevant Post-Casey Precedent 
The Court in Stenberg v. Carhart 144  did not evaluate the 
constitutionality of informed consent statutes, but the case is important in 
understanding the development of abortion jurisprudence because it 
evinces the Court’s slow but continuous shift away from deference to 
physicians and toward deference to legislatures. 145   The dissenting 
opinion analogized the majority’s reasoning to that of Akron, but 
disapprovingly called the majority opinion physician-deferential.146  The 
dissent also argued that the state should be able to take a position when 
medical authorities are in disagreement, and that the Court should defer 
                                                                                                                                  
 139 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The 
joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter provides the narrowest grounds 
for the judgments in which various other Justices concurred to form majorities on 
different issues. Under the rule of Marks . . . the joint opinion is therefore cited for the 
holdings of the Court.”) (citations omitted). 
 140 Casey, 550 U.S. at 985–86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. at 984–93. 
 142 Id. at 992; see also supra text accompanying note 107. 
 143 Casey, 550 U.S. at 985–87. 
 144 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 145 Id. at 971 (discussing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) to support 
the proposition that there exists “beyond doubt the right of the legislature to resolve 
matters upon which physicians disagreed”). 
 146 Id. at 969 (“The Court’s decision today echoes the Akron Court’s deference to a 
physician’s right to practice medicine in the way he or she sees fit.  The Court, of course, 
does not wish to cite Akron; yet the Court’s holding is indistinguishable from the 
reasoning in Akron that Casey repudiated. No doubt exists that today’s holding is based 
on a physician-first view which finds its primary support in that now-discredited case.”). 
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to the legislature’s position in such cases. 147   The danger in adopting the 
dissent’s position, however, is that it allows legislatures, which 
undeniably have a political agenda, to manipulate and misconstrue 
medical findings and facts.148 
The final relevant precedent in understanding the way abortion 
jurisprudence has impacted informed consent statutes is Gonzales v. 
Carhart. 149   The Court in Gonzales essentially accepted the position 
articulated in the Stenberg dissent and adopted a standard that grants 
deference to legislative fact-finding, as opposed to the weight of the 
medical evidence.150  Importantly, however, the Court stopped short of 
granting states complete and unfettered discretion, explaining that the 
Court has the duty to engage in its own evaluation of both the law and 
the facts where fundamental constitutional rights are involved, especially 
where district court testimony demonstrated the falseness of legislative 
findings.151  The dissent in Gonzales criticized the majority for being 
overly deferential to the legislature.152 
                                                                                                                                  
 147 Id. at 970 (“The Court fails to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State 
to take sides in a medical debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake and 
even when leading members of the profession disagree with the conclusions drawn by the 
legislature.  In Kansas v. Hendricks, we held that disagreements among medical 
professionals ‘do not tie the State’s hands in setting the bounds of . . . laws.  In fact, it is 
precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest 
latitude.’ Instead, courts must exercise caution (rather than require deference to the 
physician’s treatment decision) when medical uncertainty is present.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 148 See generally Dreweke & Wind, supra note 7.  See also Richardson & Nash, supra 
note 56. 
 149 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 150 Id. at 163 (“The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical 
uncertainty persists.  The Court’s precedents instruct that the Act can survive this facial 
attack.  The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass 
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”). 
 151 Id. at 165–66 (“Although we review congressional fact-finding under a 
deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight on 
Congress’ findings.  The Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review 
factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake . . . As respondents have noted, 
and the District Courts recognized, some recitations in the Act are factually 
incorrect . . . Uncritical deference to Congress’ factual findings in these cases is 
inappropriate.”). 
 152 Id. at 175–79 (“The trial courts concluded, in contrast to Congress’ findings, that 
‘significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact 
D & E] is the safest procedure  . . .  Today’s opinion supplies no reason to reject those 
findings.  Nevertheless, despite the District Courts’ appraisal of the weight of the 
evidence, and in undisguised conflict with Stenberg, the Court asserts that the Partial–
Birth Abortion Ban Act can survive ‘when . . . medical uncertainty persists.’  This 
assertion is bewildering.  Not only does it defy the Court’s longstanding precedent 
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IV.  ABORTION CONFUSION: CIRCUIT COURTS STRUGGLE WITH THE 
AMBIGUOUS UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES, AND INCREASINGLY MANIPULATIVE INFORMED CONSENT 
STATUTES 
A number of circuit courts that have applied the undue burden 
standard to abortion informed consent statutes have echoed Justice 
Scalia’s concerns, demonstrating that the obscurity of the undue burden 
standard has presented the circuit courts with an incredible challenge.153  
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. 
Sundquist,154 expressly acknowledged that judges can and, in fact, do 
disagree regarding the point at which a burden becomes an 
unconstitutional undue burden.155  The author of the concurrence did not 
seem to find this troubling, commenting that this was not surprising 
given the subjective nature of the standard.156   The dissent in Memphis, 
on the other hand, found this uncertainty to be very troublesome and 
agreed with Justice Scalia that the undue burden standard was easy to 
manipulate. 157 
In another case, Karlin v. Foust,158 the court was bewildered as it 
attempted to distinguish between a burden that is “undue” and one that is 
merely “incidental.”159  The Seventh Circuit struggled to make sense of 
the undue burden standard, finally concluding that a burden that only 
persuades women is acceptable.160  A burden is only undue, the court 
concluded, if it actually prevents women from obtaining an abortion that 
they would have otherwise had. 161   In the Karlin court’s opinion, 
incidental increase in cost or inconvenience of obtaining an abortion does 
not present an undue burden unless that increase rises to the level of 
                                                                                                                                  
affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no carve-out for circumstances of 
medical uncertainty; it gives short shrift to the records before us, carefully canvassed by 
the District Courts.”) (citations omitted). 
 153 See cases cited supra note 31. 
 154 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 155 Id. at 467 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 468 (“The majority’s outcome-driven decision today ignores the standard of 
review we are bound to employ in adjudicating such an appeal; perverts the law; and does 
violence to the constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed to every female in this 
country . . . . to say that the minor female has the right to have an abortion without 
parental consent as long as she overcomes extreme logistical hurdles is to say that she has 
no right at all.”) (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 158 Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 159 Id. at 480. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
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actually preventing women from having access to an abortion.162  The 
court upheld the disclosure provision of the informed consent statute 
only after concluding that it could be construed to mandate strictly a 
topic of discussion, however, reasoning that physicians must have the 
ability to use their medical judgment to tailor the content of the 
disclosure to the particular circumstances of the woman.163  The court 
cautioned against incorporating mandatory disclosures of specific 
information that limit physicians’ discretion and medical judgment.164   
Years after Karlin, lower courts continue to express uncertainty and 
insecurity in applying the undue burden standard. The Okpalobi v. 
Foster165 court was puzzled with regard to when courts are permitted to 
apply the undue burden standard.166  The Fifth Circuit struggled with the 
“purpose” prong of the analysis, and commented that the plurality in 
Casey neglected to provide adequate guidance as to how lower courts 
should conduct that portion of the analysis.167  In attempting to apply the 
undue burden standard and engage in the “purpose” prong of the 
analysis, the court concluded that a legislature does not have to expressly 
admit to an improper purpose in order for courts to find one, and that 
courts should consider “indicia of improper legislative purpose, such as 
statutory language, legislative history and context, and related 
legislation” in its “purpose” analysis.168  The dissent agreed that the law 
had an impermissible purpose, and objected on other grounds.169 
                                                                                                                                  
 162 Id. at 482. 
 163 Id. at 473. 
 164 Karlin, 188 F.3d at 473 (“While [the statute] does strictly require that physicians 
must provide their patients with information on a number of specific topics, the district 
court’s interpretation of the informed consent requirements allows the physician to use 
his or her best medical judgment in determining the exact nature or content of that 
information.”). 
 165 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 166 Id. at 354. 
 167 Id. (“The Casey Court provided little, if any, instruction regarding the type of 
inquiry lower courts should undertake to determine whether a regulation has the 
‘purpose’ of imposing an undue burden on a woman’s right to seek an abortion.”). 
 168 Id. at 355. 
 169 Id. at 361 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent because of the elementary 
and fundamental errors that the majority has made in its reaction to a statute plainly 
aimed at making medical practice more difficult for abortion doctors. The statute may 
well constitute an unfair legislative act, but that legislative unfairness cannot be corrected 
by an unconstitutional judicial act. In sum, this case presents no case or controversy 
under Article III of the Constitution and, consequently, we have no constitutional 
authority to decide its merits.”). 
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On rehearing en banc, the court reached almost the exact opposite 
result. 170   The majority concluded that the court lacked Article III 
jurisdiction and that the matter extended beyond the scope of their 
powers.171  The dissent, however, argued that injunctive relief was the 
traditional avenue of recourse for facial challenges to abortion statutes, 
citing Casey and a number of other cases that would seem to grant circuit 
courts the authority to decide the case on the merits.172  Referencing the 
statute in question, the dissent stated that its purpose was unlawful both 
because it presented an undue burden that unconstitutionally infringed 
upon a fundamental right and also because it was crafted in a way that 
attempted to circumvent judicial review. 173   The fact that courts are 
unclear not only about how to apply the undue burden standard but also 
when it is applicable further demonstrates how flawed the standard is. 
In light of the vague and unpredictable meaning of the undue 
burden standard, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the standard as it 
pleased in A Woman’s Choice – East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman.174  
There, the court declined to even make a good-faith inquiry into what the 
Supreme Court intended, stating instead that, since the Casey Court did 
not give more guidance as to what exactly the term “large fraction” 
means, they would not “peer into the dark abyss of speculation” to figure 
out when the amount of women affected becomes a “large fraction.”175  
Instead, the majority heedlessly concluded that a statute or regulation 
that prevents some, but not all, women from having an abortion is 
constitutional.176  The majority scoffed at the dissent’s suggestion that a 
statute that prevents even just one percent of women from obtaining an 
abortion can be an undue burden, if that regulation only affects one 
                                                                                                                                  
 170 See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 171 Id. (“Sitting as an en banc court, we consider whether the district court properly 
enjoined the ‘operation and effect’ of the Louisiana state tort statute at issue, which 
provides a private cause of action against medical doctors performing abortions. 
Although, in this facial attack on the constitutionality of the statute, consideration of the 
merits may have strong appeal to some, we are powerless to act except to say that we 
cannot act: these plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these defendants, the 
Governor and Attorney General of Louisiana, and consequently we lack Article III 
jurisdiction to decide this case.”). 
 172 Id. at 453 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
 173 Id. at 443 (“This purpose is illegitimate not only because [the statute] unduly 
burdens a constitutionally protected right, but also because it seeks to evade judicial 
review.”). 
 174 305 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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percent of women to begin with.177  In response, the dissent reminded the 
majority that the statute should be analyzed based on the impact it has on 
those to which it applies, 178  and even submitted that the majority 
impermissibly applied the Salerno standard, instead of the appropriate 
undue burden standard.179 
More recently, in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion 
Services v. Lakey, 180  the Fifth Circuit neglected to apply the undue 
burden standard because the plaintiff, in a display of artful pleading, only 
raised compelled speech claims.181  The Fifth Circuit erred by failing to 
apply the undue burden standard, however, as the Supreme Court 
“established the undue burden test as the sole standard for assessing the 
constitutionality of an abortion regulation, rather than as a threshold 
inquiry for triggering strict scrutiny review.”182  Furthermore, the Lakey 
court stated that, under Casey, the manner in which physicians provide 
information is irrelevant.183  In fact, however, the Court in Casey stated 
that the way in which information is delivered to patients could impact 
its constitutionality, particularly if it is delivered in a way that is intended 
to “shock” the woman or inflict psychological distress.184 
                                                                                                                                  
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 709 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 179 Newman, 305 F.3d at 706–07 (“The first question—how many women must be 
affected—is really another way of putting the question about facial challenges that the 
majority addresses.  In this connection, despite its disclaimers, one is left with the strong 
impression that the majority is applying either United States v. Salerno, or something 
very close to it. In essence, it holds that a state statute like the one before us now would 
be unconstitutional only if there was no set of circumstances under which it was valid—
by which it seems to mean that not a single woman in Indiana would find the law’s 
burdens tolerable.  This is an impermissible back-door application of Salerno.  Worse yet, 
it assumes the answer to the question before us: whether the system Indiana wants to put 
in place will unduly burden Indiana women.  Since the pertinent part of the statute has 
never gone into force, the majority indulges in the presumption that the law imposes no 
burden at all. But this presumption is found nowhere in our jurisprudence, at least for 
laws implicating fundamental constitutional rights. Furthermore, this methodology is 
inconsistent with Casey.”). 
 180 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 181 Id. at 577. 
 182 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 854 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 183 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580 (“Casey did not analyze the doctor’s status based on how 
he provided ‘specific information.’”). 
 184 Casey, 505 U.S. at 936 (“To this end, when the State requires the provision of 
certain information, the State may not alter the manner of presentation in order to inflict 
psychological abuse, designed to shock or unnerve a woman seeking to exercise her 
liberty right. This, for example, would appear to preclude a State from requiring a woman 
to view graphic literature or films detailing the performance of an abortion operation. Just 
as a visual preview of an operation to remove an appendix plays no part in a physician’s 
securing informed consent to an appendectomy, a preview of scenes appurtenant to any 
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The Lakey court also misstated or misunderstood the holding in 
Casey when it wrote: 
[T]he requirement that, to avoid the description of the sonogram 
images, a victim of rape or incest might have to certify her status 
as a victim, despite fearing (by the very terms of the certification) 
physical reprisal if she makes her status known . . . does not 
transgress the First Amendment. If the State could properly 
decline to grant any exceptions to the informed-consent 
requirement, it cannot create an inappropriate burden on free 
speech rights where it simply conditions an exception on a 
woman’s admission that she falls within it.185 
The Casey Court, however, invalidated the spousal notification 
requirement precisely because of the safety issues it raised for affected 
women and their families.186  Perhaps the Lakey court realized some of 
the flaws of its evaluation of this informed consent law when it wrote, 
“[w]e must and do apply today’s rules as best we can without hubris and 
with less sureness than we would prefer.”187 
The most recent cases that have grappled with the undue burden 
standard are a series of related cases referred to here as Rounds I, Rounds 
II, and Rounds III.188  All three cases involved the same informed consent 
provision, and each contains a dissenting opinion.189  In Rounds I, the 
majority found that the provision was unconstitutional, focusing mainly 
on the fact that it required physicians to orally convey specific 
information to patients.190  The majority wrote, “[i]n no case has the 
                                                                                                                                  
major medical intrusion into the human body does not constructively inform the decision 
of a woman of the State’s interest in the preservation of the woman’s health or 
demonstrate the State’s profound respect for the life of the unborn.”) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578. 
 186 Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94 (“The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to 
prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely 
make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will 
impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant 
number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be 
deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed 
abortion in all cases.”). 
 187 Lakey, 667 F.3d at 585. 
 188 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds III), 686 F.3d 889 (8th 
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 530 F.3d 724, 
753 (8th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 467 F.3d 716, 722 
(8th Cir. 2006). 
 189 See cases cited supra note 188. 
 190 Rounds I, 467 F.3d at 722–23. 
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Court extended the bounds of permissible regulation to laws which force 
unwilling speakers themselves to express a particular ideological 
viewpoint about abortion.”191  The dissent, on the other hand, construed 
the undue burden standard very liberally, stating that: (1) “a statute does 
not constitute an undue burden unless it in a ‘real sense deprive[s] 
women of the ultimate decision’”192; (2) a state’s interest in protecting 
fetal life implies that a state can use physicians “to inform its citizens 
about the ‘philosophic and social arguments’ against abortion;”193 and (3) 
the patient has a limited right not to listen. 194   The dissent readily 
acknowledged that the statute used frightening terms to convey the 
state’s preference for childbirth over abortion.195 
In Rounds II, the majority echoed the opinion of the Rounds I 
dissent, finding that the categorization of a fetus as a “whole, separate, 
unique living human being”196 was simply biological information that 
was “at least as relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion as 
the gestational age of the fetus, which was deemed to be relevant in 
Casey.” 197   The majority did not engage in a discussion about the 
legislature’s purpose in employing this definition of the word “fetus,” or 
the effect that this definition might have on women.198  The dissent, on 
the other hand, stated that the disclosures the Act required went “far 
beyond” the mandates of informed consent laws that have been upheld 
by the Supreme Court and circuit courts in the past.199  The dissent stated 
that “[r]ather than focusing on medically relevant and factually accurate 
information designed to assist a woman’s free choice,” which the 
Supreme Court and circuit courts have upheld, the statute in question 
“expresses ideological beliefs aimed at making it more difficult for 
women to choose abortions,” and that “[t]he obvious objective . . . is to 
use the concept of ‘informed consent’ to eliminate abortions.”200  The 
                                                                                                                                  
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 734 (Gruender, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992)). 
 193 Id. at 734–35. 
 194 Id. at 735. 
 195 Id. at 738. 
 196 Rounds II, 530 F.3d 724, 736 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 739 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 200 Id. at 740–41.  More specifically, with regard to the provision that defined a fetus 
as a “whole, separate, unique, living human being,” the dissent found that the state was 
mandating the dissemination of “metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state 
interest in regulating the practice of medicine,” and that, “[s]ince the state can assert no 
legitimate interest in defending the compulsory communication of ideological statements 
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dissent also disapproved of a suicide advisory, which was the focus of 
the Eighth Circuit’s en banc analysis in Rounds III.201 
In contrast, the majority in Rounds III found that, “[o]n its face, the 
suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor 
a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”202  Though the majority 
evaluated whether the information required in the disclosure was truthful 
and non-misleading, that was the extent of its undue burden analysis.203  
The majority opinion focused on whether the language of the provision 
implied that there was direct causality between abortion and suicide.204  
Finding that it only suggested “increased risk,” not direct causality, the 
majority decided that despite medical uncertainty, the advisory was 
truthful and non-misleading.205  The majority neglected to engage in a 
discussion about the effect of the regulation or whether it placed a 
“substantial obstacle” in the path of the woman.206  The court simply 
concluded that since the information is truthful and non-misleading it 
does not create an undue burden.207  In fact, the majority opinion does 
not mention the term “substantial obstacle” a single time.208  The dissent 
criticized the majority’s analysis and proposed standard, pointing out the 
following evidentiary problem: “[u]nder this proposed test, so long as a 
causal link between abortion and suicide would be theoretically possible, 
an advisory is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant unless [plaintiff can 
prove the absence of a causal link with ‘scientifically accepted 
certainty.’”209 
The many varying interpretations of the undue burden standard that 
have been articulated in circuit court cases since the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                  
which do not pertain to its regulation of the practice of medicine, these provisions can not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.”  Id. at 743. 
 201 Id. at 750 (“The Act’s broad mandate about psychological distress and suicide 
ideation is unlike the requirements in other informed consent laws found to be 
constitutional, which entrusted the communication of particular medical risks to the 
doctor’s best professional judgment.”). 
 202 Rounds III, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 203 Id. at 905–06. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Rounds III, 686 F.3d at 906. 
 209 Id. at 911 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Rather than recognizing this emerging 
consensus based on the scientific research in the record before the district court and all 
the subsequently submitted evidence . . . the majority theorizes about the nature of an 
advisory.  In the end it arrived at a new test divorced from the standard established in 
Casey.”). 
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adopted the standard in Casey reveal the enormously vague and circular 
nature of the standard.210  Courts are free to pick and choose which facts 
are relevant, how to weigh them, and where to draw the lines.211  This 
standard is precisely as Justice Scalia suggested—manipulable. 212   A 
standard that can be so obviously manipulated to allow judges to infuse 
their own personal moral and political viewpoints, particularly in such a 
controversial area as abortion, makes the judiciary the enforcer of an 
improper agenda, rather than interpreter of the Constitution of the United 
States.  If the undue burden standard is to remain the analysis for 
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion regulations, there must be a 
more consistent and uniform approach to its application, or the integrity 
of the judicial system, not to mention women’s right to choose, may not 
endure. 
V.  RESTORING ORDER TO ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Bringing Structure and Uniformity to the Undue Burden Standard 
Assuming that informed consent statutes were restored to their 
former integrity and that paternalistic justifications were abandoned, the 
undue burden standard would still require some structure and uniformity 
in order to adequately and consistently distinguish between permissible 
and impermissible regulations of the abortion procedure.  One way to 
bring structure to the undue burden standard is to organize its elements 
into a disjunctive, three-prong, fact-intensive test.  The first step would 
be to determine whether the information is truthful, non-misleading, and 
relevant to the decision to have an abortion.  The second prong would be 
an investigation into the true purpose of the statute, as evidenced by 
legislative history and any other relevant evidence.  Finally, courts would 
investigate what the actual effects of the statute are in reality, as 
demonstrated through concrete evidence, not theory or conjecture. 
These elements are all present in in the current undue burden 
standard, but the Court has not provided any clear structure for its 
application.  Determining that something is an undue burden or a 
substantial obstacle is more of a conclusion than a test.  The lack of any 
consistent analytical process allows courts to pick and choose what to 
focus on and makes the standard easy to manipulate.  To help circuit 
                                                                                                                                  
 210 See supra text accompanying notes 107, 112. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
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courts avoid making arbitrary, inconsistent and unsubstantiated 
determinations as to whether a regulation imposes an undue burden, the 
application of the undue burden standard should be structured into a 
three-prong analysis composed of the concepts disjointedly discussed in 
Casey.  Circuit courts’ analyses and evaluations should be heavily 
concentrated on: (1) whether the information is actually truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion; (2) the true 
purpose of the statute or regulation; and (3) the effect of the statute or 
regulation.  Reformulating the undue burden standard as a three-part test 
would force the courts to address all the aspects of the standard, thereby 
creating some organization and uniformity in both analysis and outcome. 
Circuit courts should first engage in an analysis of whether 
proposed disclosures consist of information that is truthful, non-
misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion.  In order to 
determine the relevance of the information, courts should consider which 
approach to informed consent jurisdictions have adopted; “physician-
based” or “patient-based.”213  Furthermore, determining the veracity of 
the information should be a heavily factual analysis, informed by 
science, studies, and most importantly, physicians’ medical 
judgment214—not the opinions and baseless assertions of legislatures.215  
Only truthful, complete, medically relevant information should be 
included in informed consent statutes. 216   Medically inconclusive or 
                                                                                                                                  
 213 See supra Part II. 
 214 Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 465 (7th Cir. 1999) (“In reaching this conclusion, 
we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a state abortion statute should not 
unduly limit a physician’s discretion in making medical determinations; see, e.g., Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396–97 (reasoning that a physician must be afforded adequate 
discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 
355–56 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In Jane L, the 
Tenth Circuit held unconstitutional a Utah law that equated viability with twenty weeks 
gestational age as measured from conception because, inter alia, the law had the 
impermissible purpose of usurping the physician’s responsibility for determining fetal 
viability and, thus, providing a vehicle for challenging the holding of Roe v. 
Wade . . .  the court also rests its conclusion that the Utah legislature adopted the measure 
for a forbidden purpose on the fact that the act on its face denied physicians the discretion 
granted them under well-established precedent.”). 
 215 See Roe, supra note 56, at 208 (“The proposed standard of review will incorporate 
a closer examination of the scientific foundation underlying specific informed consent 
statutes that gives greater deference to the views of the scientific and medical 
communities at large, rather than deferring to legislative determinations of medical fact. 
Such review is imperative to maintain the integrity of informed consent given 
legislatures’ increasing proclivity to misuse scientific or medical information to achieve a 
particular, typically political, end.”). 
 216 See generally Roe, supra note 56. 
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incomplete information, by its very nature of incompleteness, can be 
untruthful and misleading, thereby undermining the purpose of informed 
consent and negating the disclosure principles upon which it is based.217 
Furthermore, the information contained in all mandatory 
disclosures should be limited to the standards, and guidelines of the 
associations and authorities that govern the medical profession.218  Such 
medical associations are undoubtedly better equipped to determine the 
credibility and relevance of medical and scientific information as it 
pertains to informed consent than are courts or legislatures.  The content 
of specific disclosures in informed consent statutes, if there are to be any, 
should be evaluated and approved by medical professionals and 
researchers and should fall within the parameters of acceptable medical 
knowledge, standards, and guidelines.  Experts in the medical field 
should apprise our informed consent statutes, not the other way around. 
After a thorough analysis of the facts and reports from medical 
professionals regarding the credibility and relevance of legislatures’ 
proposed disclosures, courts could determine whether the information is 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an abortion.  
First, if a court were to find the mandated information to be untruthful, 
misleading, or irrelevant, the undue burden standard should not apply.  
The statute should instead fall under the dominion of the First 
Amendment because physicians’ free speech rights would be most 
directly implicated, not women’s rights.  Forcing physicians to disclose 
information that is not medically relevant or accurate not only offends 
traditional First Amendment notions of autonomy and self-expression but 
also forces physicians to betray the trust of their patients and their 
profession as a whole.  Therefore, such disclosures should be treated as 
compelled speech under the First Amendment and reviewed under strict 
scrutiny. 
Alternatively, if legislatures want to voice their preference for 
childbirth and their respect for potential life through disclosures of 
medically inconclusive information, they should be required to 
simultaneously disclose that: (1) the information is incomplete or 
inconclusive; (2) the state is voicing its express preference for childbirth 
over abortion; and (3) there are alternative perspectives regarding 
abortion generally.  Under this alternative, legislatures could still express 
their preference for childbirth over abortion and make women aware of 
inconclusive medical information that might persuade women not to 
                                                                                                                                  
 217 See Vandewalker, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 218 See supra note 11. 
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have abortions, but they could not manipulate women into thinking the 
information is neutral, complete, and certain. 
If courts find proposed disclosures to be truthful, non-misleading, 
and relevant, they should then scrutinize statutes’ purpose.  Courts 
should not simply defer to legislatures’ stated purpose.  Courts should 
consider legislatures’ stated purpose, but they should also examine other 
factors, such as the nature and quality of the information in proposed 
disclosures, statutes’ legislative history, states’ holistic policy regarding 
women’s reproductive health, and statutes’ legal and medical 
importance.  Though it is not courts’ responsibility to evaluate states’ 
policy decisions, it is courts’ job to ensure that laws upon which those 
policies are built fall within the boundaries of the Constitution. 
If, for example, a legislature were to pass a law that satisfies the 
first prong of the analysis but requires actions or disclosures that that are 
medically and legally superfluous, then a court should conclude that the 
statute has an impermissible purpose; that the legislature was not 
attempting to protect the life and health of the mother or the potential life 
of the fetus.  In that instance, the burden imposed by the law and its 
dissuasive effects should not be permissible.  If, however, a court were to 
find that the law served some medically or legally relevant purpose, then 
any dissuasive effect the statute has might be permissible, and not an 
undue burden, because of the other legitimate accomplishments of that 
law. 
Even statutes with honest and appropriate informational 
disclosures, enacted for permissible purposes, could pose an undue 
burden as applied.  Therefore, courts should evaluate statutes’ actual 
effects on women’s ability to obtain abortions.  This step of the analysis 
is what courts have tended to focus on up to this point.219  Like the rest of 
the undue burden analysis and as Justice O’Connor suggested, statutes’ 
effects should be evaluated using a highly factual analysis. 220  
Conclusions that statutes’ present either mere inconvenience or undue 
burden should not rest on judges or legislatures baseless opinions as to 
statutes’ effects.  Rather, courts should engage in a factual analysis, 
informed by studies and statistics from the given state and, where 
applicable, testimony from women who have been impacted by the 
legislation. 
Courts will inevitably have the most discretion during this prong of 
the analysis, but they should still attempt to maintain uniformity and 
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consistency.  Implementing a fact-intensive analysis, informed by 
studies, testimony, and other reliable evidence, will make it more 
difficult for courts to ignore the realities of statutes’ impact when 
deciding whether the effect of a statute presents an undue burden for 
women seeking abortions.221  For example, a court should not conclude 
that a twenty-four hour waiting period is not an undue burden if the 
evidence and studies demonstrate that it actually results in a delay of a 
week or more for most women.222  Nor should a court conclude that a 
disclosure stating that an abortion can lead to an increased risk of suicide 
or cancer is truthful and non-misleading, and therefore not unduly 
burdensome, when medical evidence does not support those claims.  
Rather, courts should carefully consider the evidence to determine, 
objectively, whether a “large fraction” of the women affected by the 
statute are prevented from obtaining an abortion, or are otherwise facing 
an undue burden, such as being restricted from the most common types 
of abortion.223  Courts should also define “large fraction” in numerical 
terms, as being fifty percent of women affect or more, for example.  The 
determinations made in each step of this analysis should lead to the 
conclusion that a given regulation is a substantial obstacle or undue 
burden, and therefore unconstitutional, as opposed to using the term 
“substantial obstacle” itself as the test. 
As Justice O’Connor suggested, a highly fact-intensive analysis is 
the only way to make the undue burden standard workable and avoid 
arbitrary and capricious application.224  Engaging in a factual analysis 
would force legislatures to stay true to the purposes of protecting the 
health and life of the mother and the potential life of the fetus, while still 
allowing them to express their preference for childbirth over abortion.  It 
                                                                                                                                  
 221 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 861 (3d Cir. 1994) (“By 
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would also assist circuit court judges in evaluating this very personal, 
emotional, and controversial issue rationally, without improperly 
considering their own moral or political convictions.  Adopting the 
proposed solution is the best way to truly protect women’s fundamental 
right to terminate their pregnancies, and to control their own health and 
lives.  Taking a structured approach is the best way to accomplish 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the undue burden 
standard, and the only way to avoid its arbitrary and capricious 
application. 
B.  Reviving the Spirit of Informed Consent: Limiting Includable 
Information to Medical Facts and Excluding Ideology by Denying 
Deference to Legislature 
The greatest danger recent informed consent statutes pose is that 
they manipulate women, who are already in a very vulnerable position, 
into thinking that they are being given unbiased, complete information, 
when in reality Casey and its progeny have invited legislatures to turn 
informed consent statutes into covert vehicles for delivering states’ 
ideology.225  Legislatures justify this practice by arguing that abortion is 
different because it involves the termination of a potential life.226  Of 
course, it is true that abortion is different, and perhaps this ideological 
information should be available to women, but it should not be 
surreptitiously incorporated into informed consent statutes.  All people, 
including women, assume the information physicians disclose while 
obtaining patients’ informed consent to abortion is straightforward, 
objective, medical information because for all other medical procedures 
it is.227 
Informed consent in the abortion context should be no different 
than that of any other medical procedure.228   It should be limited to 
scientific and medical information that is supported by the weight of 
authority, inform the patient of any included information that is 
inconclusive or for which there is disagreement among medical 
professionals, and be free from information that is ideological or that is 
not directly related to the procedure.229  Allowing states to express their 
viewpoints covertly through mandatory disclosures in informed consent 
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statutes gives states license to manipulate women and prevent them from 
making truly informed choices.230 
The informed consent disclosure standards discussed in Part I, 
namely, the professional practice, reasonable person, and self-
determination standards, do not currently play any role in the evaluation 
of the constitutionality of abortion informed consent laws.231  The undue 
burden standard should incorporate these different standards to eliminate 
some of the ambiguity in deciding what is “relevant” to a woman’s 
decision to have an abortion.  Currently, under the undue burden 
standard legislatures have the greatest authority to decide what is 
relevant. 232   If these standards were considered, however, abortion 
informed consent laws would begin to fall in line with states’ general 
informed consent laws with regard to who gets to decide the relevance 
and materiality of informational disclosures.233 
C.  Disallowing Paternalism as an Acceptable Justification for Informed 
Consent Statutes 
Legislatures have justified many recent informed consent statute 
requirements, such as mandatory waiting periods, by arguing that women 
benefit by being “given” the extra time to reflect upon their options 
before making their decision. 234   Courts have accepted different 
variations of this rationale as legitimate.235  This rationale perpetuates 
stereotypes and the paternalistic notion that women need protection and 
are incapable of making difficult decisions on their own. 236   It also 
assumes that women do not spend the appropriate amount of time 
reflecting upon their options and circumstances before deciding to get an 
abortion, and that they cannot have, know, or understand their options 
without these mandatory disclosures and waiting periods.237  In reality, 
however, women are more than capable of making these decisions on 
their own.238  Studies have shown that “women who make the decision to 
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have an abortion understand the responsibilities of parenthood and 
family life;239  six in ten are already a parent.”240   More than half of 
women who have an abortion say they want a child or another child at a 
later point in their life. 241   Most cite concern or responsibility for 
someone else as a factor in their decision. 242   These and other such 
studies should be recognized and considered during courts’ analyses and 
should prevent such paternalistic notions about women from being 
perceived as legitimate and compelling justifications for some 
requirements of recent informed consent statutes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is true that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt,”243 but Justice Scalia was right to retort that “[r]eason finds no 
refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion,” either.244   Restructuring the 
undue burden standard into a disjunctive, three-part test in which each 
prong is analyzed using objective criteria and a heavily factual analysis is 
a comprehensive approach to making to making the undue burden 
standard workable in practice.  This approach would still allow states to 
further their interests in preserving potential life and persuading women 
to choose childbirth, but would be much more effective in protecting 
women’s rights than the undue burden standard in its current form.  
Some solution must be adopted, because as it stands the undue burden 
standard is too easy to manipulate and allows states to maneuver around 
the safeguards the Supreme Court has attempted to put into place. 
Furthermore, in order to preserve the integrity of the doctrine of 
informed consent, the physician-patient relationship, and the medical 
profession in general, courts must engage in an independent analysis of 
the accuracy of mandated factual disclosures and refrain from the 
admittedly easier but ineffective practice of giving deference to 
legislative fact-finding.245  Moreover, when considering the purpose of a 
given statute, paternalistic notions should be abandoned as illegitimate 
and unacceptable justifications for any statutes that regulate abortion.  By 
reducing unwarranted judicial deference to legislative fact-finding, 
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eliminating paternalism, and only then proceeding to a structured 
analysis of constitutionality under the undue burden standard, courts can 
finally achieve consistency in their analyses and holdings for similar 
statutes, increase the legitimacy of the judicial system, and more 
effectively protect the rights of women in this delicate and controversial 
area. 
 
